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An Evaluation Of The Impact Of Macro-Economic Programmes In Addressing Educated Youth Unemployment In Zimbabwe

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ABSTRACT

This study sought to evaluate the impact of nine macro-economic programmes/blueprints crafted by the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) since attaining independence in 1980 to achieve economic growth which would address unemployment among educated youths. The unit of analysis (respondents) were policy-makers operating at national level drawn from government, politics and training institutions such as colleges and universities. The research was quantitative and qualitative in nature. Data was collected using self-completing questionnaires and face-to-face in-depth interviews with key informants. The study found out that six of the nine macro-economic policies did not achieve the desired impact in addressing the problem of high unemployment among educated youths since the number of unemployed educated youths continued growing. The study recommended broad-based consultation with stakeholders during the crafting stage of macro-economic policies. Formative evaluation and appointing accountable committees/officers to drive clearly defined deliverables based on clear timelines was also recommended together with crafting investor-friendly policies, stamping out of corruption and implementation of curriculum reforms to achieve a balance between theory and practice in higher education.

Key words: youth unemployment, macro-economic programmes, unemployment, economic blue-prints

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the attainment of independence in 1980, the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ), initiated macro-economic programmes in the form of economic blue-prints aimed at spurring economic growth as way of addressing the unemployment problem. This study sought to evaluate such macro-economic blueprints that were launched by the Government of Zimbabwe since 1980. In evaluating the impact of the macro-economic policies in addressing educated youth unemployment (EYU); policy-makers in government, education and curriculum development were identified as respondents who were best positioned to give primary information on the impact of economic policies in addressing the unemployment debacle. It was noted that most policy-makers had seen the problem of unemployment evolving over time as such they were expected to understand its causes, impact, magnitude and solutions better. Their wide experience concerning the problems facing the country favoured them to give informed, reliable and holistic responses which had a national perspective on the impact of macro-economic policies in addressing the problem of high unemployment among educated youths.

In this study youths are defined as those persons aged between 15 to 35 years in line with the Constitution of Zimbabwe (GoZ, 2013). Educated youths according to this study are those youths who successfully completed a minimum of Ordinary Level and they include those who went on to acquire post-secondary certificates, diplomas and degrees.

The study concerned itself with the following macro-economic programmes/ blueprints or socio-economic programmes in the order in which they were introduced in Zimbabwe from 1980 up to date (2016): Marxist-Leninist Scientific Socialism:1980-1990, Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP):1991-1995, Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST): 1996-2000, Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP): 2001-2005, National Economic Revival Programme (NERP): 2006-2008, National Economic Development Priority Programme (NEDPP): 2008, Short-Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP 1 & 2): 2009-2012, Mid-Term Plan (MTP): 2012 to 2015 (abandoned in 2013) and the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Social and Economic Transformation (Zim-Asset): 2013 – 2018. Table 1 below is a summary of the overall intended goals or the main thrust for each of the economic blueprints that were initiated over the years from 1980 to 2016.

Table 1: Summary of the thrust of economic blueprints crafted to improve economic performance in order to address unemployment in Zimbabwe (1980-2016)

PROGRAMME	OVERALL GOALS/ THRUST/ MAIN FEATURE OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC BLUEPRINT
1980-1990 Marxist-Leninist Scientific Socialism *(As a guiding political ideology at independence in 1980)*	-Formation of cooperatives with Government and donors giving initial capital as a way of absorbing the unemployed population made up youths some of whom were returning refugees, demobilised ex-combatants, war collaborators, ex-detainees and the general population which had been rendered jobless by the sanctions battered Rhodesian economy. -Cooperatives would be a vehicle for employment creation and economic growth.
1991-1995 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)	-The main thrust was to reduce government expenditure on social services and channel more money to the productive sectors of the economy to create employment. -IMF and World Bank had promised to avail funds if government did away with a controlled economy to introduce a free market economy. - Relaxation of labour laws to make it easy for struggling companies to retrench/ down-size in order to reduce their wage bill and re-capitalise so that they would employ even more workers. - Retrenched employees were encouraged to use their retrenchment packages and skills to form new companies which would grow to employ even more workers.
1996-2000 Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST)	-This was a form of 're-branded ESAP' *(ESAP had become very unpopular and had triggered civil unrest and for that reason it had to be re-branded by changing name).* -In essence, ZIMPREST's aims were similar to those of ESAP.
Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP) 2001-2005:	-The programme was meant to arrest inflation and boost production. MERP coincided with the Fast-track Land Redistribution and Land Reform Programme aimed at creating employment to the indigenous population by redistributing agricultural land which had been in the hands of the White minority for over a century. - To improve economic performance through increased agricultural productivity and thus absorb the unemployed population.
National Economic Revival Programme (NERP) 2006-2008:	-This was aimed at reviving industry whose capacity utilisation had dropped to 10% (CZI, 2013). NERP's primary goal was to control inflation by boosting production on farms and in industry to create employment.
National Economic Development Priority Programme (NEDPP): 2008:	-To restore food production and control hyper-inflation by channeling resources towards priority areas only and this included the manufacturing sector to increase production, create jobs and reduce unemployment.
Short-term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) 2009-2012:	-It was meant to restore order in the economy. The informal sector had taken over making governance and control very difficult. This followed disputed General Elections which led to the formation of a Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe.
Mid-Term Plan (MTP) 2012 to 2015 (abandoned in 2013)	-Its aim was to restore production by resuscitating the productive sectors of the economy to create employment and get the economy running again (it was abandoned after peaceful General Elections in 2013).
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Social and Economic Transformation (Zim-Asset) 2013–2018 (current):	-The aim was to indigenize the economy, grow the productive and manufacturing sectors of industry, improve energy generation in order to improve overall economic performance and in so doing create two million two hundred and sixty five thousand jobs (2 265 000) in five years.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

At independence in 1980 Zimbabwe was faced with numerous historical imbalances caused by the past colonial government. These imbalances had to be corrected as a pre-requisite for socio-economic take-off and pre-condition for sustainable development. Makanye and Munhande (2013) noted that the socio-economic and political landscapes were dominated by the minority white colonial settlers. The Black majority had been relegated to the margins. High unemployment and poverty were prevalent. Those who were in employment occupied menial jobs in both government and the private sector. In order to correct the imbalances, government churned out a number of policies and programmes. Ibid (2013) stated that Growth with Equity which aimed at establishing a socialist egalitarian (classless) society in Zimbabwe was introduced. This was followed by the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) of 1982/83 which aimed at creating a new order, ridding the Zimbabwean society of the vestiges of exploitation, unemployment, poverty, disease, and social insecurity. These had to be systematically destroyed to make a fresh start and build the foundations of a true free democratic state based on the principles of majority rule (GoZ, 1991).

The Marxist-Leninist Zimbabwean brand of Scientific Socialism adopted at independence in 1980 was not only a political ideology; it was largely viewed as an economic programme in that it encouraged the formation co-operatives whose capital was provided by the government through the Ministry of Cooperatives as way of creating employment. It set minimum wages, controlled prices of commodities and encouraged systematic destruction of the bourgeoisie class to create a classless society. Cooperatives were viewed as a vehicle for creating employment for the unemployed masses most of whom were youths aged between 15-35 years who had been rendered jobless by not only the effects of the war but also by a non-performing economy which had given in to international pressure exerted through imposition of economic sanctions on the colonial government of Rhodesia (Stoneman, 1988).

The Marxist-Leninist Scientific Socialist ideology which ran from 1980 to 1990 according to Adams (1991) did not achieve the intended results because most cooperatives collapsed. After exhausting the initial capital which was advanced by the GoZ, most cooperators disbanded. On the other hand banks were not keen to open credit lines with cooperatives because of lack of collateral. Unemployment continued to rise. Socialism as an political ideology and economic management policy failed in most countries including the Soviet Union where it was initially believed to have succeeded. This made politicians lose hope on pursuing the ideology.

The Government turned to the Breton Woods Institutions (The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) for advice and funding. The advice led to the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which ran from 1990 to 1995 (GoZ, 1991). Essentially ESAP did away with a controlled economy in favour of a free-market economy. It also aimed at reducing government expenditure on social services such as education and health to channel resources to the productive sectors of the economy. ESAP

led to relaxation of labour laws giving rise to massive retrenchments across the economy based on the principle that such retrenchments would lead to the recovery of industry and commerce which if 'right-sized', would re-capitalise, grow faster, expand and recruit even more workers thereby addressing the unemployment problem. Mhone (1993) noted that ESAP achieved negative results such as an increase in unemployment because of retrenchments. The customer base of companies shrunk because of reduced earnings which affected disposable incomes among the populace. Major companies closed down while others operated at very low capacity. The rich to became richer, poverty increased and the informal sector emerged. The drought of 1992 worsened the situation and there was civil unrest across the country especially in urban areas (strikes, lock-outs and stay-aways).

ESAP became very unpopular and it was replaced by the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) which was basically a re-branded ESAP because it had similar goals of reducing government expenditure on social services as ESAP (GoZ, 1996). ZIMPREST ran from 1996 to 2000. Sachikonye (2007) carried out a study and noted that ZIMPREST achieved negative results in that unemployment rose to 50%, companies continued to retrench. Poverty and suffering was widespread until the Black majority forcibly took over agricultural land from the White minority who owned large tracts of prime agricultural land. This resulted in thousands of farm workers of the former White commercial farmers joining the unemployment market. Production on farms was affected and some industries which depended on agriculture closed because production on the farms had plummeted. The IMF and World Bank which had initially promised to fund the economic reforms reneged on their promise citing poor governance and breakdown in the rule of law (UN Report, 2010). Government gave in to the War Veterans who demanded compensation for their role in the liberation struggle and the hefty payouts triggered the start of hyperinflation in what came to be known as 'The Black Friday' in economic circles (Hartmann and Werner, 2011). Opposition political activities escalated; inflation and unemployment went out of control.

The Government of Zimbabwe went on to introduce the Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP) to replace ZIMPREST. MERP ran from 2001 to 2005. Government of Zimbabwe (2000) stated that the thrust of MERP was to cause economic recovery. Poverty escalated (Kwashirai, 2009). MERP met the same fate of failure as the other economic programmes before it. An estimated 3 million Zimbabweans some of whom highly qualified left the country in search of better life in the Diaspora (Tevera and Crush, 2003). The brain-drain heavily affected economic reform efforts. High unemployment was recorded and hyperinflation eroded incomes and savings for those who remained in jobs. The country was declared a pariah state by the Western countries which were not happy with the way land was redistributed and this effectively cut foreign direct investment. Shortage of foreign currency affected imports of goods needed to support production. Unemployment went out of control and reached 80%.

The National Economic Revival Programme (NERP) came into effect and ran from 2006-2008. During NERP hyperinflation reached two hundred and thirty-one million percent Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2009). Informal sector and black market activities flourished as the formal sector faced numerous challenges. Power cuts/ load-shedding worsened the situation. Corruption escalated. Manufacturing virtually stopped and shops closed. Basic commodities went out of stock including fuel, sugar, mealie-meal, cooking oil, bread and flour. Unemployment rate became the highest in the world and reached 95% (World Factbook, 2013).

National Economic Development Priority Programme (NEDPP) was launched in 2008 to restore food production but it was abandoned following a disputed election. During NEDPP hyperinflation continued. Economic systems such as banks, local currency, retail shops and production collapsed. Unemployment continued to rise unabated. NEDPP was abandoned following the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU). Industry capacity utilisation dropped to 10% . Hyperinflation rendered the local currency useless and valueless (Hartmann et al, 2011). Some workers walked out of their jobs because earnings which ran into trillion Zimbabwe dollars per month became useless thereby worsening the already high unemployment situation.

The Short-term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) ran from 2009-2012. It was launched by the GNU as a strategy to restore order. During STERP the local currency (Zimdollar) was abandoned in favour of a multi-currency system dominated by the US Dollar and the South African Rand. The banking sector recovered. Inflation dropped to 2% (CZI Report, 2012). Basic commodities became available in shops but most of them were imports from neighbouring South Africa and from China. Industry failed to recover due to cheap imports, poor mothballing strategies used during the down-time and this led to equipment becoming obsolete. The effects of the brain-drain which had started in early 2000 made recovery of the manufacturing sector difficult. Liquidity crunch crept in as the nation continued to spend the valuable multi-currencies on imported goods which included second-hand cars, second-hand clothes, domestic electric gadgets and retail goods to fill supermarkets. Unemployment remained very high and the informal sector flourished in a country where most informal sector activities are illegal according to the law.

Mid-Term Plan (MTP) scheduled to run from 2012 to 2015 was abandoned in 2013 following peaceful General Elections which brought an end to the GNU. During MTP the productive sector of industry failed to recover. Unemployment continued at 95%. The economy went into deflation because of liquidity crunch.

Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Social and Economic Transformation (Zim-Asset) 2013 – 2018 is the current economic policy driving government's economic decisions. The main thrust of Zim-Asset was to create two million two hundred and sixty-five thousand jobs by 2018 (GoZ,2013). While it is too early to evaluate Zim-Asset as at 2016, it is prudent to note that since its inception 770 companies had closed down in the first three months of 2014. Unemployment of educated youths continued to rise (ZEPARU, 2015). Several

initiatives to create jobs for the educated youths such as: Indigenization, Community Share Ownership Trusts and Kurera/ Ukondla among others were launched but the situation of unemployment continued to worsen. Foreign direct investment remained low because of policy inconsistencies. According to the Zimbabwe Independent of 28 October 2015 - 'In June 2015 Zimbabwe ranked 155 out of 189 economies on the Ease of Doing Business globally'. Zim-Asset was still running at the time of this research, but unemployment was still increasing.

3. METHODOLOGY

This Scientific Research Study was in the realms of Social Science. Sekaran and Bougie (2013:19) contended that 'Scientific Research is purposive, it has rigor, it has testability, replicability, objectivity, generalizability, parsimony, precision and confidence' and it is for these reasons that it was adopted. The study was premised on the Quantitative and Qualitative Research paradigms in that self-completing questionnaires and face-to-face interviews were held with key informants. Adoption of the two research methods allowed for validation, confirmation and triangulation of the findings and the strategy allowed each of the two research methods to cater for the weaknesses of the other since Cooper and Schindler (2013:3) noted 'Researchers increasingly admit that the quantitative research alone cannot reveal all they need to know in order to make smart business decisions'.

3.1 POPULATION

In determining the population size, document analysis noted that the Legislature in Zimbabwe had 210 elected Members of Parliament in the House of Assembly and 80 Members of Senate in the Upper House all of which are constitutionally mandated to make national laws and policies (Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, 2013). Among that number (290 policy-makers) are 2 Vice Presidents, 30 Cabinet Ministers and their Deputies. In this study 30 Permanent Secretaries and 10 Ministers of State in charge of Provinces were also viewed as policy-makers with a national impact while the rest of the Government's administrative structure was treated as policy implementers whose jurisdiction was out of the purview of this research. That put the number of national leaders to 330. Dye (2007) defined policy as what Government chooses to do or not to do and for that reason, the Members of Parliament, Senators, Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and the Presidium were taken as policy-makers because they directed government on what to do or not to do. Curriculum policy became important for this study. Gatawa (1990) defines curriculum as anything that takes place under the auspices of a school, college or university. There was therefore a need to include curriculum policy-makers among the respondents. To calculate the population of curriculum developers in this study, the Vice Chancellors of Public and Private Universities in Zimbabwe and their Deputies (Pro-Vice Chancellors) and Deans of Faculties, College Principals, the Education Officers at the Curriculum Development Unit and

Head Office made up a total number of 370. Thus for purposes of this study, the population for Policy-makers made up of national leaders, senior civil servants and Curriculum Developers was stated as:

if ***m*** represents Members of Parliament *(210)*

if ***s*** represents members of Senate/ Upper House *(80)*

if ***p*** represents Permanent Secretaries *(30)*

if ***g*** represents Ministers of State in Provinces (Governors) *(10)*

if ***vdce*** represents Vice Chancellors, Pro Vice Chancellors, Deans of Faculties, College Principals, Education Officers *(370).*

Therefore the population of Policy-makers (Z) in this study was calculated thus:

$\mathbf{Z} = \sum (m+s+p+g+cdce)$

Therefore the population of Policy-makers = 210+80+30+10+370 = **700**

3.2 SAMPLING METHODS, TECHNIQUES AND SAMPLING DESIGN

A lot of considerations were taken into account in coming up with a representative sample size which had the capacity to make the findings, conclusions and recommendations of this study valid, reliable, replicable and reasonably generalizable. Multi-stage sampling, purposive sampling and stratified sampling methods were used to identify the respondents from among Policy-makers.

First, Zimbabwe was divided into ten administrative provinces or regions and that was easy since the Provinces and Provincial boundaries already exist *(see Fig.1below).*

Fig. 1: Map of Zimbabwe showing the country's ten administrative provinces



Source: Ministry of Local Government, GoZ (2013)

For stratified sampling, respondents in Provinces were divided into rural and urban and then into Districts and this was also easy because the demarcations already exist. In all cases, the gender dimension was taken care of so that there was reasonable gender balance. Using the same Sample Size Calculator software, with a

population of 700 policy-makers in Zimbabwe, at 95% confidence level and 5% margin of error, the sample was **248** as depicted by Survey System (2015). Table 2 below:

Table 2: Summary of the Population and Sample Size used in the study

Respondents	Approximate Population	Confidence level	Confidence interval/ Margin of error	Manageable Sample size
Policy-makers *(Political leadership in Government, Senior Civil Servants and Curriculum Developers)*	700	95%	5%	248

4. FINDINGS

4.1 GENDER OF RESPONDENTS (POLICY-MAKERS)

The questionnaire required respondents to indicate their gender. This was important as it helped in understanding the balance or lack thereof. Such a finding would aid to the validity and reliability of the findings of this study. Table 3 below shows the gender of policy-makers who were respondents in this research.

Table 3: Gender of Policy-makers who were respondents

N=226

Attribute/ Gender	Frequency	Percentage frequency
Male	172	76.1
Female	54	23.9
Total	**226**	**100**

Out of a total of 226 respondents 172 (75.4%) were male and 54 (23.6%) were females. While the wide disparity exposed the gender imbalance at the top echelons of decision-making in Zimbabwe, the statistic in itself was viewed as a true reflection which is indicative of the real situation of gender imbalance at decision-making levels in Zimbabwe as supported by Feresu (2010). Mothers bear the brunt if educated youths in the home are unemployed in an African set-up. It was imperative that the issue of gender imbalance at policy-making level be addressed as it could affect the crafting of policies that help address youth unemployment. A gender balanced sample could have been most ideal, but sadly that was not to be in this research owing to reality on the ground.

4.2. DISTRIBUTION OF POLICY-MAKERS BY AGE GROUP

Since there was need to know the impact of macro-economic policies including their success and failure since 1980, the age of respondents mattered.

Table 4: Age distribution of Policy Makers who were respondents

Age of respondents	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
21-30 years	1	0.4	0.4
31-40 years	8	3.5	3.9
41-50 years	43	19	22.9
51-60 years	65	28.8	51.7
61-70 years	74	32.7	84.4
above 71 years	35	15.6	100.0
Total	**226**	**100**	

Of the 226 policy-makers who were respondents 1 (0.4%) was aged 21-30 years, 8 (3.5%) were aged 31-40 years, 43 (18.9%) were aged 41-50 years, 65 (28.5%) were aged 51-60 years, 74 (32.5%) were aged 61-70 years, 35 (15.4%) were aged 71 years and above. Table 4 above shows that the highest number of the respondents (32.5%) were aged 61-70years. The age distribution also shows that cumulatively, a majority of respondents (96.1%) were aged above 41 years. Such a finding was good for this study because the older the respondent the more the likelihood of having experienced the impact of the macro-economic policies since independence in 1980. While the older Policy-makers were expected to know and understand the gravity of the problem of educated youth unemployment and how the macro-economic policies helped or failed to help in addressing the problem, their advanced age could in itself be an impediment when they fail to understand the plight of the unemployed educated youths due to wide age disparity. It can be proffered that it takes a youth to understand a youth and having policy-makers who are past their retirement age could affect the speed with which the problem of educated youth unemployment is resolved.

4.3 DISTRIBUTION OF POLICY-MAKERS WHO WERE RESPONDENTS BY LENGTH OF SERVICE AS POLICY-MAKER

Question 3 required respondents to indicate their length of service as policy-makers. This was particularly important given that the more the years, the more the policy-maker is expected to be familiar with the problem of educated youth unemployment and the more he/she is expected to know the impact of macro-economic policies.

Table 5: Length of service as a Policy-maker

How long have you been in your job/ role as a policy-maker?	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
1-5 years	6	2.7	2.7
6-10 years	25	11.1	13.8
11-15 years	30	13.2	27
16-20 years	44	19.5	46.5
21-25 years	90	39.8	86.3
over 25 years	31	13.7	**100**
Total	**226**	**100**	

Table 5 shows that 6 of the Policy-makers who were respondents in this research (2.7%) had been in their posts for 1-5 years, 25 (11.1%) had been policy-makers for 6-10 years, 30 (13.2%) had been in posts for 11-

15 years, 44 (19.3%) had been in posts for 16-20 years, 90 (39.5%) had been in posts for 21-25 years and 31 (13.6%) had been in posts for over 25 years.

The statistics show that 97.3% of the respondents had been policy-makers for more than five years and such respondents were viewed as having adequate experience to give grounded responses about the impact of macro-economic policies in addressing unemployment among educated youths.

4.4 CATEGORY OF POLICY-MAKERS

The issue of public policy has several categories of policy-makers. This study was more interested in those who make or determine employment/ labour policy, economic policy and curriculum policy at national level.

Table 5: Whether the respondent is a political/national leader, senior civil servant (executive) or curriculum developer

Which word/phrase best describes your job?	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Political/ National Leader	26	11.5	11.5
Senior Civil Servant	60	26.5	38
Curriculum Developer/ Educationist	140	62	**100**
Total	**226**	**100**	

Out of a total of 225 respondents, 56 (11.5%) were political/ national leaders (Members of Parliament, Senators, Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State [Provincial Governors] or Deputy Ministers), 60 (26.7%) were Senior Civil Servants operating at national level while 139 (61.8%) were curriculum developers in the education system covering education officers and educationists in colleges and universities.

4.5 RATING THE SUCCESS OF MACRO-ECONOMIC PROGRAMMES AIMED AT STIMULATING ECONOMIC GROWTH IN ORDER TO CREATE JOBS

Policy-makers who were respondents in this study were asked to evaluate the success or failure of the economic blueprints that were crafted by the GoZ since 1980 to stimulate economic growth and address youth unemployment. For purposes of interpreting the rating from respondents to conclude whether a programme had impact or not, this study adopted a strategy where the rating scale responses were compressed into two as illustrated below:

The following three responses were added and interpreted to mean that the macro-economic programme was a failure:

- Never heard about the macro-programme.
- Macro- economic programme was a failure
- Macro-economic programme marginally succeeded

The following three responses were added and interpreted to mean that the macro-economic programme was a success:

- Macro-economic programme satisfactorily succeeded
- Macro-economic programme was very successful
- Macro-economic programme was extremely successful.

Table 6: Evaluation of the success or failure of the macro-economic programmes

N=226

How successful was each of these economic programmes and ideology in addressing the unemployment problem among educated youths in Zimbabwe?	u Never heard about the programme	v The programme was a failure	w The programme marginally succeeded	x The programme was satisfactorily successful	y The programme was very successful	z The programme was extremely successful	Percent who rated programme as a failure (=u+v+w)* 100 226	Percent who rated programme as success (=x+y+z)*100 226
Marxist-Leninist Scientific Socialism (1980-1990)	101	54	50	8	10	3	90.7	9.3
ESAP (1991-1996)	21	143	41	11	6	4	90.7	9.3
ZIMPREST (1997-2000)	57	100	48	16	3	2	90.7	9.3
MERP (2001-2005)	62	111	46	2	3	1	97.3	2.7
NERP (2006-2008)	63	118	32	9	3	1	94.2	5.8
NEDPP (2008)	60	118	33	12	2	1	93.4	6.6
STERP I and II (2009-2012)	54	81	67	21	2	1	89.4	10.6
MTP (2012 to 2015)abandoned in 2013	56	115	37	13	4	1	92	8
Zim-Asset (2013 – 2018) –current (Rate its effectiveness to date)	25	68	98	22	8	5	84.5	15.5

Table 6 shows that out of the 226 respondents 21 (9.3%) rated Scientific Socialism as a success and 205 (90.7%) rated it as a failure. 21 (9.3%) rated ESAP as a success and 205 (90.7%) rated it as a failure. ZIMPREST was rated by 21 respondents (9.3%) as a success and 205 (90.7%) rated it as a failure. 6 (2.7%) of the respondents rated MERP as a success while 219 (97.3%), NERP was rated by 13 (5.8%) as a success while 213 (94.2%) rated it as a failure. Out of the 226 policy-makers who were respondents in this study 15 (6.6%) rated NEDPP as a success while 211 (93.4%) rated it as a success. 24 respondents (10.6%) rated STERP as a success while 202 (89.4%) rated it as a failure. MTP was rated by 226 respondents and out of those 18 (8%) rated it as a success while 208 (92%) rated it as a failure. 35 (15.5%) rated the ongoing ZIMASSET programme as a success from its inception up to the date of carrying out this study while 191 (84.5%) stated that it is already a failure. The ratings show that a very high number of respondents (84% and above) rated all economic blue-prints which were put in place to stimulate economic growth thereby creating jobs for educated youths as failures. It is common cause that if a programme was a failure then its impact was low or insignificant in addressing educated youth unemployment.

Table 7: Responses of policy-makers as to what could have caused the failure of the macro-economic programmes given that unemployment continued to rise.

Given that unemployment of educated youths continued to rise, what could have caused the failure of Zimbabwe's macro-economic blueprints in as far as mitigating the problem of high unemployment among educated youths?	Frequency *(number of respondents who cited the cause of failure)*	Percent	Rank Order
Politically biased implementation	9	3.9	10
Preference to cheap labour	5	2.2	15
Lack of transparency and accountability	9	3.9	10
Corruption	35	15.4	3
Lack of funds	38	16.7	2
Failure by the public to pay back loans	4	1.8	16
Economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe	4	1.8	16
Policies are bias towards the rich	7	3.1	14
No political will on the part of Government to implement the Blueprints	62	27.2	1
Closure of industries	9	3.9	10
Incompetent government	12	5.3	7
Poor government policies and priorities	13	5.7	6
Youths not aware of programmes put in place to assist them.	12	5.3	7
Low local and foreign direct investment	17	7.5	5
Low economic growth	10	4.4	9
Low job creation	5	2.2	15
Political instability	3	1.3	18
Lack of start-up capital	29	12.7	4
Poor international relationships	8	3.5	13

In Table 7 above, respondents gave their perceptions as to what could have caused the failure of the macro-economic blue-prints from addressing the unemployment problem among educated youths. The last column on Table 7 is the rank order of reasons cited by the respondents. The most popular or most frequently highlighted cause of failure was ranked first and the least popular cause was ranked eighteen . Table 7 shows that the highest number of respondents singled out lack of political will in government in implementing the blue-prints as the major cause of their failure. The second reason most frequently cited by the respondents was lack of funds followed by corruption. Lack of start-up capital, low foreign direct investment and poor government priorities and policies were ranked fourth, fifth and sixth respectively. Government incompetence, lack of awareness by the youths of the programmes put in place to assist them and low economic growth featured as seventh and ninth respectively in the rank order of the reasons cited by respondents as reasons for the failure of economic blue-prints. Closure of industries, politically biased implementation, lack of transparency, poor international relations, policies that are biased towards the rich, preference of cheap labour by employers, low job creation and failure to pay back loans were the other reasons cited by respondents.

4.6 FACTORS THAT NEGATIVELY AFFECTED SOME OF ZIMBABWE'S ECONOMIC BLUEPRINTS IN MITIGATING THE PROBLEM OF EDUCATED YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT (EYU)

Face-to- face in-depth interviews were administered on 35 key informants. The table below summarises their responses.

Table 8: Responses from key informants as to why economic programmes meant to address EYU were a failure

Factors mentioned	Frequency
Lack of consultation with other stakeholders (especially the youths)	7
Lack of political will on the part of government	7
Lack of funding for implementing programmes and policies	6
Economic blue-prints too theoretical and not practically achievable	6
High corruption	3
Sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by Western countries	3
Poor administration in sectors of the economy such as parastatals	2
Lack of meaningful local and foreign direct investment	1

The above findings show that key informants felt that there are four main reasons that have contributed to why Zimbabwe's economic blueprints have not achieved any in transforming the national development agenda of creating employment for the educated youths- These are lack of consultation with stakeholders during the process of developing the blueprints, lack of political will to support the resourcing and implementation of the blue-prints, lack of funding of the implementation, monitoring and evaluation process as well as blueprints which are too theoretical and based on desktop economics which are not implementable. These reasons from in-depth face-to-face interviews resonate well with those cited by policy-makers on questionnaires.

In response to a question on what could have gone wrong with the economic blue-prints given that educated youth unemployment continued to rise since 1980, a male key informant from Matabeleland South aged between 51 - 60 years old had this to say: "*The blueprints were designed by legislators instead of taking the views of the youths themselves. The youths should have been involved in coming up with the blueprints that suit them rather than being forced on them".*

This study accepts this observation but adds that the issue of consultation should be broad-based to cover not only the educated youths themselves but also the business community, funders, investors, the training institutions, economists and labour organisations to mention but just a few. Models from other countries that successfully solved the unemployment problem also need to be studied widely before crafting such documents which must be followed through at implementation stage

In response to the same question on what could have gone wrong, a female key informant from Mashonaland West Province aged between 51 - 60 years old stated, "*Nobody supervises and assesses the implementation of Zimbabwe's economic blue prints. Therefore it becomes nobody's obligation to solve the problem of unemployment among educated youths".*

Another key informant aged between 60-70 years from Manicaland province remarked: *"Sanctions; we can't sell products to some European Union countries. We can only export unprocessed cheap raw materials".*

There is also another key informant aged between 31 to 40 years from Mashonaland West Province who blamed the failure of economic policies on poor enforcement of national employment laws which state that retirement age is 65 years yet there is no enforcement mechanism with thousands working well beyond 65 years. The informant remarked: *'No one is willing to retire. There is no one to enforce retirement laws. Old people hold on to jobs in the public service and private sector. For instance, you find old teachers being recalled to rejoin the service or being advised to apply for extension of service yet there are millions of unemployed educated youths. They are closing vacancies which should go to educated youths'.*

The question on what could have gone wrong with our macro-economic policies also got the following response from another key informant who accused authorities for not guarding the mineral wealth jealously: "*How can economic policies succeed? Minerals are being looted by those charged with responsibility of safeguarding them due to selfish desires and this has led to natural resources not benefitting the country as a whole but individuals".*

On what could be done to make macro-economic programmes a success, a key informant from Harare Metropolitan Province had the following advice: "*There must be balance between theory and practice in the curriculum of colleges and universities so that educated youths will have enough hands-on skills to apply what they learn. By doing so, they can venture into self-employment and become employers themselves*".

In support of the above, another key informant from Matabeleland South in the age group 51-60 explicitly put this point, "As long as our institutions continue to prioritise theory at the expense of practical skills, there is no economic blue-print which will resolve unemployment among educated youths. The skills they possess do not dove-tail with the needs of the employers hence the educated youths will remain unemployed."

4.7 TESTING HYPOTHESIS

There was need to test the hypothesis as spelt out in this study using the logistic regression model.

H_0: The macro-economic programmes launched by government to mitigate unemployment among educated youths since independence did not achieve any significant impact.

H_1: The macro-economic programmes launched by government since independence to mitigate unemployment among educated youths achieved significant impact.

Table 9: Logistic Regression Model – Impact of Macro Economic Programmes in addressing educated youth unemployment

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step	Q8.1 Marxist-Leninist Scientific Socialism (X_1)	-1.004	0.332	10.566	1	0.001	0.352
	Q8.7 STERP 1&2(X_2)	1.755	0.340	10.001	1	0.001	2.756
	Q8.8 MTP(X_3)	-.736	0.266	8.273	1	0.004	2.314
	Constant	0.442	0.391	1.306	1	0.255	1.554

$Y= 0.442 -1.004X_1 +1.755 X_2-0.736 X_3$ where,

X_1= Marxist-Leninist Scientific Socialism.

X_2= STERP 1&2

X_3= MTP

We reject H_0 in favour of H_1 and conclude that some of the macro-economic programmes had a significant impact on addressing educated youth unemployment namely: Marxist-Leninist Scientific Socialism, the Short-Term Economic Recovery Programme (STERP 1 and 2) and the Mid-Term Plan (MTP).

If the findings from the logistic regression analysis on Table 9 are analysed together with the findings on Table 6 above, it can be noted if only three out of nine macro-economic programmes had significant impact, it can be concluded with certainty that most of the macro-economic programmes launched by government to mitigate educated youth unemployment did not achieve any significant impact.

5. CONCLUSION

Given the findings of this research, it is clear that most the macro-economic policies put in place since independence did not have significant impact in creating employment for the educated youths. Several reasons were given by the respondents in this study and it is imperative that the cited reasons which led to the failure be addressed if future macro-economic policies are to achieve the goal of creating employment for the unemployed educated youths.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

In order for macro-economic policies to achieve economic growth which would in turn achieve impact in creating employment for educated youths, this study recommended that:

1. Broad-based consultations with stakeholders should be carried out during the crafting stage of the macro-economic policies, to avoid crafting policies which are good on paper but not implementable in practice.

2. Macro-economic blue-prints should get adequate funding and support for them to achieve the desired impact. Luring foreign direct investment through investor friendly policies, implementing curriculum reforms and zero tolerance to corruption are but some such strategies.

3. Committees accountable for driving the implementation of clearly defined deliverables of the macro-economic blue-prints to do with creating employment for the educated youths should be appointed. Formative evaluation should be enforced.

4. There is need for political will in implementing the objectives and targets of the macro-economic policies on the part of government.

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